A course in game theory
"[This book] presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing general...
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Auteurs principaux : | , |
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Format : | Livre |
Langue : | anglais |
Titre complet : | A course in game theory / Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein |
Publié : |
Cambridge (Mass.), London :
The MIT Press
, C 1994 |
Description matérielle : | 1 vol. (XV-352 p.) |
Sujets : |
- 1. Introduction
- I. Strategic games
- 2. Nash equilibrium
- 3. Mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium
- 4. Rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions
- 5. Knowlidge and equilibrium
- II. Extensive games with perfect information
- 6. Extensive games with perfect information
- 7. Bargaining games
- 8. Repeated games
- 9. Complexity considerations in repeated games
- 10. Implementation theory
- III. Extensive games with imperfect information
- 11. Extensive games with imperfect information
- 12. Sequential equilibrium
- IV. Coalitional games
- 13. The core
- 14. Stable sets, the bargaining set, and the shapley value
- 15. The Nash solution