Game theory

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Auteurs principaux : Fudenberg Drew (Auteur), Tirole Jean (Auteur)
Format : Livre
Langue : anglais
Titre complet : Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole
Publié : Cambridge (Mass.), London : the MIT Press , copyright 1991
Description matérielle : 1 vol. (XXIII-579 p.)
Contenu : Contient des exercices
Sujets :
  • I. Static games of complete information
  • 1. Games in strategic form and nash equilibrium
  • 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium
  • II. Dynamic games of complete information
  • 3. Extensive-form games
  • 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions
  • 5. Repeated games
  • III. Static ames of incomplete information
  • 6. Bayesian games and bayesian equilibrium
  • 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design
  • IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information
  • 8. Equilibrium refinements : perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection
  • 9. Reputation effects
  • 10. Sequential bargaining under incomplete information
  • V. Advanced topics
  • 11. More equilibrium refinements : stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance
  • 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games
  • 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium
  • 14. Common knowledge and games